Paper Session I-B - The Space Exploration Initiative and the Aero-Space Plane Launcher by Hannigan, Russel J. & Webb, David C.
The Space Congress® Proceedings 1991 (28th) Space Achievement: A Global Destiny 
Apr 23rd, 2:00 PM - 5:00 PM 
Paper Session I-B - The Space Exploration Initiative and the Aero-
Space Plane Launcher 
Russel J. Hannigan 
Visiting Research, Space and Hypersonics, CREST Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, France 
David C. Webb 
President, International Hypersonic Research Institute, Winter Springs, FL 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Hannigan, Russel J. and Webb, David C., "Paper Session I-B - The Space Exploration Initiative and the 
Aero-Space Plane Launcher" (1991). The Space Congress® Proceedings. 11. 
https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings/proceedings-1991-28th/april-23-1991/11 
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in The Space Congress® 
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact 
commons@erau.edu. 
THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SPACE CONGRESS
April 23-26 1991, Cocoa Beach, Florida
THE
SPACE EXPLORATION 
INITIATIVE
AND
THE
AERO-SPACE PLANE 
LAUNCHER
Russell J. Hannigan Dr. David C Webb
Visiting Researcher, Space & Hypersonics President
CREST Ecole Polytechnique International Hypersonic 'Research Institute 
54, rue Boissonade, 1213, Jaguar Court
75014 Paris, France Winter Springs, Florida 32708, USA
2-2?
THE SPACE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE & 
THE AERO-SPACE PLANE LAUNCHER
Russell JL Hannigan1 & Dr. David C. Webtf
ABSTRACT
Consideration is given to the critical operational issues 
associated with large-scale space programs, like the 
proposed Space Exploration Initiative (SEl), in order to 
demonstrate their intimate relationship with the Earth-to- 
orbit launch systems being used. These operational issues 
include failure resilience and continuous access. It is 
shown that scenarios using expendable, vertically launched 
Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicles (HLLVs) as the primary space 
launch means, may be difficult to accomplish. This is 
because the performance characteristics of such vehicles - 
most notably reliability and availability - contradict the 
identified critical operational requirements of SEI. An 
alternative strategy is outlined for the Lunar Base part of a 
future SEI program. This scenario uses a duel launch 
architecture consisting of the HLLV and the proposed fully 
reusable, winged Aero-Space Plane Launcher (ASPL). 
Relevent technical issues of the hardware elements are 
identified and discussed from the total program perspective. 
The rationale used to optimize the scenario is outlined, and 
the potential value of carefully matching payload types to 
the launcher performance is subsequently demonstrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of the motivations, the establishment of a 
permanent base on the Moon followed by manned missions 
to Mars - referred to under the generic title as the Space 
Exploration Initiative - are unquestionably extraordinary 
endeavors. The political, organizational and economic 
challenges inherent in such enterprises are immense. 
However, it is the array of technical problems that poses 
the greatest hurdles and, in many respects, these problems 
drive the political and organizational issues, especially 
those relating to economics. Thus, the choice of technical 
solutions has a strong bearing on the chances of the 
program being funded and remaining funded.
The determination of the optimum technical solution for 
SEI is a complex process that must match system 
performance with the restrictions imposed by funding and 
technology. However, because of the large-scale and long- 
term nature of the program, the operational issues are likely 
to have the greatest impacts on the solution and, therefore, 
economics. Understanding precisely what is involved in 
supporting manned space programs like SEI is absolutely 
fundamental to determining the best overall solution. Two 
issues are pre-eminent The first is the ability of a 
particular operational scenario to absorb failures, and the 
second is the need to maintain uninterrupted access to space 
and the systems in space.
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Failure resilience : Regardless of the effort put into a 
program like SEI, failures - although "probablistic" • are 
inevitable. Such failures can range from the loss of a 
major system, to the malfunctioning of individual 
components within a system. The more resilience or 
robustness that is built into the program from the 
beginning, the higher the probability that operations will 
be allowed to proceed despite such failures. Alternatives, 
where reasonable or needed to enhance safety, should always 
be available. Clearly, because of the requirement to 
maintain a continuous access for SEI operations, as 
described below, the need for resilience is a fundamental pre­ 
requisite.
Continuous access : Large scale manned spaceflight 
activities differ significantly from most other smaller-scale 
operations because each element has to depend upon one or 
more other elements functioning properly. This differs 
fundamentally from the more classical space programs, 
such as communications and science satellites, that must 
carry all the systems needed to support their entire mission. 
Continuous access is needed to supply the hardware 
elements (e.g. landers, habitats), logisitics (e.g. food, water, 
air), spare parts for routine and unexpected maintenance 
(e.g. lights, valves etc.), the mission payloads (e.g. science 
instrumentation), and the crew. Supply of each will need to 
start with the first element launch and continue thereafter 
on a regular and reliable basis over the program life-time.
Another potentially critical concern relating to continuous 
access is orbital testing. Developing subsystems, systems 
and operational procedures for space applications usually 
demands repeated testing to the "edge of the envelope." 
Failures that occur during traditional test campaigns are 
usually the only method of fully characterizing the 
performance of a particular piece of hardware or operational 
procedure. Indeed, hardware that is not rigorously tested 
may cover up inherent design flaws that could lead to later 
failures. Obviously, from an engineering standpoint, the 
most prudent method of verifying SEI hardware and 
procedures, especially complex systems like a lunar lander 
or assembly operations, is to repeatedly test them in orbit 
Unfortunately, because of the current high cost of space 
operations, coupled with limited opportunties, such testing 
is minimized.
The single common factor having the greatest impact on 
the above issues is the Earth-to-orbit launch vehicle. 
Throughout the paper, discussion will focus on the impacts 
launch vehicles have on SEI-type activities, within the 
general context of those issues relating to failure resilience, 
continuous access and orbital testing.
2. THE HEAVY-LIFT LAUNCH VEHICLE
The utilization of heavy-lift launch vehicles (HLLV) seems 
almost synonomous with any SEI-type activity that is 
considered. Effectively, it is automatically assumed by 
many SEI planners that an HLLV is, firstly, a necessary
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capability and, secondly, the primary launch system. 
Typically, HLLVs arc expendable, vertically launched 
rockets such as the proposed Shuttle-C and ALS. It is true 
that, because of the considerable amount of mass that needs 
to be launched, some form of "bulk" launch system is 
needed, and therefore requiring an HLLV. However, by 
examining closely some of the technical problems inherent 
with SEI, as identified in Section 1, it is clear that more 
than just an HLLV-type launcher is required
Limitations of HLLVs
The positive aspects of HLLVs are well understood, with 
the "low cost per pound" to orbit as the principal advantage 
(1). However, on the negative side, despite this the actual 
dedicated costs range anywhere from $100 million, as is 
targetted for the original ALS, to $300+ million for a 
Shuttle-derived vehicle. Even this is only a partial 
representation as it does not fully take into account what is 
actually being launched - i.e. the payload itself. If the 
payload was just an equally priced "lump of mass," then 
low cost per pound would clearly have some meaning. For 
example, the propellant needed by each mission to the 
Moon (e.g. around 75 tonnes) can be described precisely in 
this way. However, for the remainder of the other payloads, 
it is somewhat less than fair to describe them on a mass 
only basis.
There are many "generic** reasons why expendable launchers 
like the HLLV would negatively impact the payloads being 
carried, as discussed below:
Reliability : Vertically launched expendable boosters arc 
notoriously unreliable, compared with terrestrial 
transportation systems. Typically, boosters like the Atlas, 
Titan, Delta and Ariane have reliabilities that range from 90 
to 98%. This is an inherent characteristic of such boosters, 
and it is clearly important to understand why this should be 
the case. As mentioned in Section 1, extensive testing is 
fundamental to increasing reliability. However, because of 
the demanding function they perform, launch systems tend 
to be very large, complex and highly integrated pieces of 
machinery. Thus, as a direct consequence, expendable 
launchers are expensive. The developer of an expendable 
launcher is, as a result, in a "Catch-22** situation as many 
test launches are required to "iron-out" technical problems, 
but the cost to perform such tests is so high making it 
unaffordable. Even performing several "tens" of test 
launches (assuming this was possible) would seem an 
unnecessary luxury in view of the uncertain "probabilistic" 
nature of the failures and $1+ billion price tag. Yet, history 
has shown that launchers fail with an uncomfortable 
frequency. For example, the Ariane launcher had only five 
"test" flights, but has experienced five failures in about 40 
missions, making it one of the most unreliable launchers. 
Despite this, Ariane continues to win orders for commercial 
satellites, and the users arc prepared to suffer the 
consequences of random losses, because of the high 
economic value of the mission. The same is true of the
US military programs despite a similarly low Titan 
reliability - the need for military intelligence far outways 
the cost associated with a random failures. Even with the 
possibility of an engine-out capability, it is difficult to see 
how reliability can be significantly improved because 
testing is so limited.
Availability : Launcher availability essentially dictates 
when a user will be able to launch a payload. However, 
experience has shown that on-time launch dates arc difficult 
to guarantee. As with unreliability, unavailability is an 
inherent feature of expendable launchers. The simple 
reason being that a brand-new booster must be 
manufactured and tested before launch and, because they arc 
complex systems, the lead-time is considerable. In a very 
real sense, the countdown starts several years before the 
launch date. Availability can be increased through mass 
production. However, mass production would not bring 
down the cost of the launch enough to generate more users 
and, in any case, critical line-items such as liquid rocket 
motors tend to inhibit higher production rates, as is the 
case with Ariane, Delta, Atlas and Titan, With the much 
larger and more complex HLLV, it is difficult to see how a 
high availability rate will be achieved - especially in view 
of the high value of the payload being carried.
Impact,^ of HIJ^V on SEI Activities
The use of the HLLV as the primary launch system for SEI 
adversely affects the critical failure resilience and continuous 
access operational requirements in a profound way, as 
discussed previously. The inevitable net consequence is 
that it drives the cost of the payloads up and reduces the 
rate at which they can be launched If the reliability and 
availability arc limited, then the HLLV flight rate must be 
minimized to avoid losses. Therefore, for the program to 
maximize their use, payloads will be designed to be as 
highly capable as possible, meaning they must also be 
highly integrated and lightweight These arc conflicting 
requirements which increase the cost of the payload and 
reduce the number built This, in-turn, places higher 
reliability demands on the launcher - thus increasing the 
HLLV costs and impacting the availability.
This viscious circle is further exasperated by the fact that 
SEI payloads will be critically dependent on payloads 
launched by other boosters in a continuous sequence. 
Thus, the loss of one payload would have a extreme 
economic and schedule impact on the total program. For 
example, in the NASA 90-day Study of Human 
Exploration of the Moon and Mars (2), 3 or 4 HLLVs arc 
needed one after the other to assemble the hardware for just 
one lunar landing mission. At this rate, after only two or 
three sorties to the Moon, there would be a better than 
50:50 chance of losing one of the next boosters.
Figure 1 attempts to show the relationship between flight 
rate, loss rate and down-time as a function of reliability as 
generated by a Monte Carlo simulator. As a reference point,
nomimally it takes about 4 years to build up to the 
maximum flight rate of 10 per year, achieving a total of 88 
flights in the 10-year span. However, even at 98% when 2 
losses occur, it takes 7 or 8 years before about 10 flights 
per year are achieved and, perhaps more importantly, only 
78 mission are flown. This reduction is brought about by 
the **knock-on effects" of down-time.
LOMM FV* DowrvTIm
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Figure 1
Nowhere within the 90-Day report are contingency 
measures described to absorb such a HLLV loss. This is 
typical of such studies. It is considered unlikely that 
another HLLV would be risked immediately after a failure, 
especially if the payload being carried was of very high 
value, such as a lander. (Note: Scenarios with "cheap*9 
payloads are discussed in Section 5.) The typical down-time 
for current ELVs launching relatively inexpensive payloads 
is 6 to 12 months. The technical and organizational 
problems associated with reducing this down-time to 
months or weeks, with the much more complex HLLV 
booster carrying an expensive and schedule-driven payload, 
should not be underestimated.
A further problem relates to orbital testing. The Space 
Shuttle is, as yet, the only vehicle capable of returning 
payloads for inspection after test However, the limitations 
placed on its flight rate will effectively eliminate 
consideration of its regular use for SEI-type test activities. 
The alternative use of an HLLV, or any other large ELV, for 
such operations will do little to help the situation for many 
of the same reasons outlined above.
Hie use of the HLLV for SH can be compared with the 
following terrestrial analogy : Consider what the status of 
inter-continental trade and development would be like today 
without the invention of the aircraft, and if it had to rely on 
ocean going vessels. Especially if such vessels could not be 
tested first, if they couM not be recalled to port if a problem 
arose, if these ships had to be discarded after only one 
voyage and if the users had to pay the full production costs 
of the vessels. Although it is dangerous to make this sort 
of direct comparison, primarily because space launching is
significantly more difficult than terrestrial transportation, it 
does help to highlight the intimate relationship of the 
transportation system with the role it fulfills.
3. THE AERO-SPACE PLANE LAUNCHER
The aero-space plane launcher (ASPL) is one concept for a 
space transportation system which is radically different than 
existing systems. Essentially, it is a fully resusable, 
highly maintainable, one or two-staged winged vehicle 
capable of taking-off and landing horizontally. Many studies 
have shown that this type of configuration is critical to 
significantly reducing dedicated launch costs (3). Achieving 
such a capability is an immensely difficult task, as is well 
understood within the aerospace community. But, in 
general, all indications are that this will be a realisable goal 
within the next 10-15 years. Assuming it is indeed 
achievable, the impacts on reliability and availability could 
be as follows:
Reliability : The most significant advantage positively 
impacting reliability is that the ASPL can be recovered. 
During the testing phase, it should be possible to 
incrementally expand the envelope so that eventually after 
many flights, and with the same vehicle, orbital flight is 
achieved. Thus, gradually over a campaign of many 
flights, the individual characteristics of the test vehicles can 
be evaluated. This is clearly critical to enhancing 
reliability. During the operational phase, ASPL-like 
vehicles should be able to return to Earth following an 
abort and, thereby, providing a means to recover the payload 
and make another launch attempt at a later date. Although 
ASPL-specific failures are possible, it is interesting to note 
that if the ASPL experienced the same "type" of failures as 
suffered by the ELVs in recent years, the ASPL and payload 
would probably have been recovered.
Availability : Once operational vehicles have been 
introduced, availability is enhanced compared with ELVs 
because a new vehicle does not have to be manufactured and 
verified for each mission. Problems associated with 
maintaining the large infrastructures needed to support the 
construction of ELVs, together with the large ground crews 
needed to integrate the various stages, are avoided. In 
addition, ASPLs also provide the potential to containerize 
the payloads in a manner that completely standardizes the 
interfaces between the payload and launcher (4). This may 
allow the satellite-to-launcher integration process to be 
reduced to hours, compared with the current days or weeks. 
Thus, because the ground operations are minimized, greater 
opportunities are provided for higher flight rates and 
significantly reduced dedicated launch costs.
To summarize, an ASPL-like capability could provide a 
much more "user-friendly** means of accessing space. The 
ability to launch payloads significantly more frequently 
reliably, when demanded, and at a much lower costs than 
existing launchers, is expected to have a profound impact 
on the current space operations including SEI (5).
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A number of ASPL programs exist today with the most 
notable being the NASP. HOWL and Sanger Programs. 
For background, the key features of each are summarized.
NASP & NDVs
Since 1986, the US Government and the industrial 
contractors have spent nearly $2 billion on the National 
Aero-Space Plane Program which intends to develop an 
experimental aircraft - the X-30 (Figure 2) - capable of 
reaching orbit with a single-stage. NASP is generally 
regarded as one of the most technically challenging projects 
ever initiated, and the program is well known within the 
aerospace community for its research in the areas of 
advanced materials, supersonic combustion ramjets, 
computational fluid dynamics and systems integration.
THE NATIONAL AERO-SPACE PLANE 
Figure 2
The primary purpose of the NASP Program is to develop 
the technologies, systems and techniques needed for the 
eventual production of an operational fleet of aero-space 
plane launch vehicles, the NASP-Derived Vehicles. 
Presently, the "reference" NDV is designed as a highly 
maintainable vehicle capable of being turned around in a 
few days or hours, and able to place in Space Station 
Freedom orbit payloads of about 10 tonnes, at a cost of 
between $5-20 million per launch. Launch rates could be 
around 50 mission per year with a loss reliability of better 
than 99.5%. (Note : The recent OTA report (6) estimated 
that the worst case operational cost pa* launch, with 
facilities and other fixed annual costs amortized in, would 
be about $12m, with the best case being $2m.)
The NASP Program is midway through Phase 2, with 
funding running at $258m this year, and a decision in 
March 1993 is scheduled to be made to develop the first 
two experimental vehicles. After this, it is estimated that 
an operational NDV could gradually replace the Space 
Shuttle before the end of the next decade.
HJZEQL
The HOTOL Launcher was conceived as a vehicle optimized 
solely for the purpose of significantly reducing operational
launch costs. HOTOL, which was started in 1984 as a 
joint project between British Aerospace and Rolls Royce, 
uses a much more conservative design approach and more 
available technologies than NASP in order to reduce the 
development risk uncertainties. For example, air-breathing 
only occurs up to Mach 5.5, and in-coming air is slowed 
down to subsonic speeds prior to combustion. In addition, 
the original classified RB-545 engine was designed to allow 
full testing of individual sections first, allowing the engine 
performance to be fully characterized on the ground before 
installation on the vehicle. This is different to the NASP 
Program which must build and fly a full-up aircraft to test 
the engine.
The HOTOL Program was slowed when the UK 
Government decided to discontinue funding and BAe were 
asked to look for international support Unfortunately, 
these efforts where thwarted by the UK Government refusal 
to declassify the RB-545. In September 1990, BAe 
anounced an agreement with the Soviet Ministry of 
Aviation Industry for joint studies of a pure rocket version - 
the so-called "Interim HOTOL" - launched off the back of 
the Antonov-225 aircraft This study is presently 
progressing. This, and the original version of HOTOL, are 
primarily unmanned - though "manable" - vehicles designed 
to place around 7-10 tonnes in low Earth orbit for a cost of 
about $5m per launch, or about $15m if development and 
production cost recovery is amortized.
Contrary to the NASP and HOTOL Programs, Germany 
believes that the technologies for single-stage-to-orbit will 
not be available until at least 2010 or later. Therefore, they 
have embarked on the two-stage-to-orbit design known as 
Sdnger, which is currently the reference vehicle 
configuration in the German National Hypersonic Research 
Program, and is funded at $250m over five years, 
Preparations are underway in an effort to "Eufopeanize" the 
program for development within ESA. It is hoped that a 
prototype will fly in the early part of the next decade, with 
an operational system available by about 2010.
Sdnger consists of a first stage that carries the Horns 
upperstage up to a speed of about Mach 7, at which point 
the upperstage is separated Horus comes in two 
configurations: the Horus-M for manned missions (plus 
3 tonnes of payload to a Freedom (Kbit) and the Horus-C 
for unmanned cargo missions with a payload capability of 
about 7.5 tonnes to an equatorial orbit The estimated 
launch cost is about $25m per mission.
4. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
This section outlines an in orbit space transportation 
architecture based around the availability of an ASPL and 
an HLLV booster as defined earlier. For demonstration 
purposes, the scenario is specifically scoped for supporting 
a sustainable and long-term (>10 yrs) human presence on
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the Moon. Mars is not directly diseased. The intention is 
to demonstrate the practicality of such a scenario and 
highlight some of the critical technical, programmatic and 
infrastructure-related issues that are raised
Guidelines
The following is a list of some of the general "guidelines** 
used in developing scenario :
establish a permanent and expandable lunar base 
optimize the utilization of both launchers 
optimize reusable versus expendable hardware 
minimize other infrastructure elements as practical 
ensure that consequences of failures are "tolerable** 
ensure a crew return capability to the Earth 
develop strategies for "rapid** contingency missions.
Finally, there is no fundamental reason why the in-space 
transportation elements must be large. Indeed, for the 
reasons outlined in section 2, it has been the incorporation 
of HLLVs as the primary launch system in a number of 
previous studies that has driven the large size of the 
elements. It is considered that for cost and operational 
reasons there are many positive advantages to remaining 
modestly sized where appropriate, at least during the first 
few years of operations.
Elements 
The basic transportation elements consist of the :
Space Transfer Vehicle (STV) 
Manned Lunar Lander (MLL) 
Cargo Lunar Lander (CLL) 
Trans-Lunar Injection Stage (TLIS)
Each of these elements and their functional requirements are 
described as follows :
Space Transfer Vehicle : The STV (Figure 3) is fully 
reusable and its primary functional requirements are to place 
the MLL in lunar orbit, and then later return the Lunar Base 
crew and their lander to Earth orbit This concept is similar 
lo that proposed by British Aerospace (7) and utilizes an 
umbrella-like system for deploying a 200 m2 aerobrake 
made from a high temperature cloth similar to that used by 
the Shuttle Obiter. The value of this approach is that it 
could allow the compact stowage of the complete STV 
within one ASPL, allowing deployment without the need 
for on-orbit assembly. (If such a design prooved unfeasible, 
an alternative approach could utilize an aero-brake 
consisting of several solid "petals** that unfold following 
launch. This "solid** aerobrake could be left on-orbit, for 
example, while the core of the vehicle can be launched and 
returned independently.) The STV central thrust structure is 
surrounded by two hydrogen tanks and two oxygen tanks. 
Hie four tanks are the same length, but the oxygen tanks
are thinner to reflect the higher density, 
launched without cryogenic propellants.
The STV is
SPACE TRANSFER VEHICLE (STV) 
Figure 3
Manned Lunar Lander : The MLL (Figure 4) is fully 
reusable and is sized to place a crew of 3 or 4 on the Moon. 
The central structure is composed of two frustrums joined 
together by a short cylindrical insert, and is based on that of 
the STV, except that the MLL insert is shorter. Similarly, 
the propellant tanks of the MLL have the same 
hemispherical ends and interfaces as those on the STV, but 
the cylindrical center section is shorter. The avionics, power 
and other subsystems would also be similar where 
appropriate. At this level of definition it is difficult to say 
whether the commonality between the components would 
lead to significant production cost savings, as only a few 
STVs and MLLs would, at least initially, be built 
However, using a commonality approach reduces the 
number of unique systems that have to be designed, 
characterized and qualified, thereby, enhancing reliability and 
reduces the spare parts burden. The crew cabin is around 
3.5m in diameter and is equipped with a Freedom standard 
docking hatch. The MLL, like the STV, is launched 
without propellant and also without the crew on a single 
ASPL mission.
MANNED LUNAR LANDER (MLL) 
Figure 4
Cargo Lunar Lander : The CLL (Figure 5) is based on the 
MLL except that the propellant tanks and central structure 
are somewhat longer for more optimum performance. The 
manned cabin and crew related systems also have been 
removed The CLL is conceived as an expendable vehicle 
able to land from 10 to as much as 15 tonnes of cargo on 
the Moon per mission such as, for example, modules, 
rovers etc. The CLL is, at least in the early operations, 
conceived as being expendable. From a total cost 
perspective, it is probably cheaper to use each lander once 
than to recover it, since twice as many missions are 
required to land the same mass using a reusable lander as 
compared with an expendable version. In addition, the STV 
is not needed for the cargo missions, simplifying orbital 
operations and lessoning the burden on the STV, essentially 
reserving it for the manned missions where reliability is 
rather more critical. The CLL is also launched dry on one 
ASPL mission. The payload would be launched separately.
CARGO LUNAR LANDER (CLL) 
Figure 5
Trans-Lunar Injection Stage : The expendable TLIS (Figure 
6) is launched on a single HLLV booster and uses as many 
components of the launcher as possible (e.g. tanks, engines 
etc). The TLIS, which has a mass of 60 - 90 tonnes at 
launch, performs the trans-lunar injection burn and carries 
all the propellant needed by the TLIS as well as the STV, 
MLL or CLL. This avoids ever needing to bring large
quantities of propellant near the Space Station (see the next 
subsection). The TLIS is conceived as being essentially a 
"dumb** stage and is equipped only with sufficient avionics 
to keep it pointing in a fixed direction following orbital 
insertion. This is necessary to allow the STV/MLL or CLL 
to dock with it All other control and monitoring 
equipment is provided by the MLL CM* CLL.
TRANS-LUNAR INJECTION STAGE (TLIS)
MANNED & CARGO CONFIGURATIONS
Figure 6
Space Station Node Facilities
The value of on-orbit servicing of the transportation 
elements is the subject of intense debate. However, in an 
ASPL era it can be expected that the on-orbit facilities will 
be considerably more extensive than those planned for 
Freedom, simply because of the available, reliable and 
affordable capabilities of the new launcher system. 
Therefore, the trade-off may favor on-orbit servicing because 
access to the facilities is possible. Conversely, even in the 
ASPL era it may still be more cost effective to return the 
MLL or STV after every mission for precisely the same 
reasons.
Ultimately, the transition to on-orbit servicing practises 
will arise once the flight rate to Moon increases to the 
point where it is more cost effective to leave the hardware 
on-orbit For example, it might be cheaper to invest in 
orbital facilities to support servicing operations, rather than 
pushing the ASPL to steadily increasing flight rates, 
especially since the total cost of an ASH, loss would 
probably be comparable to that of the servicing facilities. 
It is possible to envisage a situation during initial
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operations where the MLL and STV is brought back to 
Earth and, as more experience is gained with the launch 
system and the behaviour of the lunar transportation 
elements has been more thoroughly characterized, a gradual 
transition to servicing facilities would be realizable. It is 
also important to note that in the Intervening period before 
orbital servicing is possible, the unique capabilities of the 
ASPL would allow the testing out of servicing-type 
operations in space, again because frequent access to space 
is more practical. Such a situation does not exist today, and 
will not until a vehicle with ASPL-like capabilities is 
introduce!
Assuming such a scenario, a conceptual design for a 
servicing facility is shown as part of Figure 7. The design 
assumed the use of Freedom in its present (Jan. 1991) 
configuration purely as a means to demonstrate what might
be practical. The concept does not require the use of the 
Freedom truss structure, but instead uses two pairs of 
pessufiied modules, arranged .in. a "L"» docked to the. 
middle nodes (3 and. 4). Tie lower end of 'die outer module 
is equipped to accept either an MLL or STV. In addition, 
these modules are- equipped with t conical skirt that is 
draped around 'the docked MLL or STV to provide an 
isothermal eai.viron.ment and. protection against meteroids.
Htts» die ooncept shown in Figure 1 direct
to the- MLL and STV, thus reserving any
hazardous EVA activity to only those off-nominal
where EVA is the only alternative, such as the
of thermal insulation.. In the ease of the .MLL,
this is particularly attractive as it ensures
to all of 'the internal, systems, allowing
mil am:ttlatic»,s to lie perttw«e4 In the
of the STV, It is possible to envisage a design where
aft the critical are located in a pressurized section
just 'below the STV/MLL so as to allow routine
servicing. Other aw provided for
the CLL tnd its.
As an sWe this type of
less. on
am the awl (2). tie
why such a be- is the 
are of site, ie, they 
arc
crew can enter the MLL and perform verification checks 
between both vehicles. When the mated STV/MLL had 
been cleared for flight, an HLLV would launch the TLIS. If 
this HLLV fails to reach orbit, the STV and MLL would 
remain safely at the Station until the next TLIS launch can 
be attempted.
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Once 'the TLIS had. been, placed in a safe- orbit, the 
STV/MLL would, rendezvous with 'the TLIS and dock. 
Propellants from, the stage'- would 'then be pumped, in to the 
STV/MLL tanks. The composite would, then be fully 
checked out before 'the TLIS main propulsion is 
Ignited, to place the STV/MLL into bans-lunar .injection, 
Hie remainder of the mission trajectory 8) follows 
a classic dpo/fo-style Lunar Orbit Rendezvous strategy, 
with the STV performing the' Lunar orbit 
manoeuvre before the MLL separates .and to the. 
surface* Meanwhile, the STV1 remains in Lunar 
its aero-brake facing 'the- Sun. to boil- 
off, fhe MLL. has lie and
with the STV, the. STV an 
injection burn, and the aero-brake is 'then, used ID the 
STV/MLL in a of '(he STV 
engine.
§
It should be noted that the scenario outlined above always 
returns the MIX to Earth orbit after every mission, as 
opposed to leaving the descent section in Lunar orbit as 
suggested by many previous studies. Thus, it eliminates 
the need to perform propellant or propellant tank transfer. 
In addition, and perhaps much more critically, it allows the 
MLL to be fully checked out before the next crew boards. 
This is particularly important during the first few years of 
operations because of safety uncertainties relating to the 
performance of vehicles like lunar landers. It should be 
appreciated that the ability to return the MLL arises by 
virtue of its small size.
o Cargo Missions
Lunar cargo missions are much simpler than manned 
missions because the hardware is expendable. A typical 
cargo mission would involve the launch of the CLL and 
cargo on separate ASPL flights, and subsequently 
integrating them at the station. Once completed, the TLIS 
would be launched and the mated CLL/cargo would 
autonomously rendezvous with the TLIS and dock. After 
the TLIS is launched, the CLL/cargo would either insert 
into lunar orbit or descend directly to the surface.
Future Expansion
If, in the future, a Lunar oxygen production facility is set­ 
up, it is possible to envisage a situation where the CLL on 
the Moon would be partially refuelled, loaded with excess 
liquid oxygen and returned to Earth. The main problem 
would be that the CLL must trade payload for the extra 
hydrogen fuel needed for the return. Nevertheless, 
potentially several tonnes of liquid oxygen could be 
returned to the Earth. Whether sufficient oxygen could be 
returned economically to refuel a fully reusable TLIS, has 
not been estimated at this stage. However, a future scenario 
that eliminates the HLLV is clearly advantageous, but only 
if at least two different types of ASPLs are available.
5. SCENARIO OPTIMIZATION
The scenario described in Section 4 is intended to 
demonstrate a level optimization that could be possible if a 
launch architecture consisting of the ASPL-type launcher 
and a HLLV booster is available. The rationale and 
approach for the scenario is driven by consideration of the 
actual payloads, and the requirements they place on the 
launch system, as seen from the critical perspective of their 
operational needs. Of particular importance, the 
optimization process develops a scenario which takes 
advantage of the best characteristics of the ASPL and 
HLLV, while minimizing the burden on each.
An HLLV is needed within SEI scenarios because of the 
large mass-to-orbit requirements. However, by its very 
nature, the HLLV is expected to exhibit relatively tow
reliability and availability, as diKas«*i in Section 3, 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to reserve the HLLV for 
those "cheap** payloads- which can be launched In, bulk, and 
as infrequently as possible to minimise the HLLV flight
rates and, therefore, HLLV loss fates,. In addition, such 
payloads should not be critical, to servicing and
maintenance-type activities in order to minimize' 
availability concerns. Because propellant makes up 'the
majority of the mass, this is an ideal payload for the HLLV,
Once a decision has been made to use the .HLLV in this 
manner, it seems reasonable to 'Configure the propellant 
tank to also be an expendable lower stage (TLIS), and use, 
where possible, suitable components from the HLLV such. 
as engines, structure and avionics. This might 'be a 
sensible approach because these components would already 
be manufactured on a production line and, therefore, the 
additional cost impact might be relatively "minor." It 
should be noted that an alternative approach of launching a 
reusable stage might seem initially to be attractive when 
considered independently. However, because of the 
additional operational complexities involved in maintaining 
such a large stage in-orbit, combined with the need to refuel 
it with propellant (e.g. tank exchange), when considered 
from an overall system standpoint it appears somewhat less 
attractive.
Finally, launching inexpensive and mass produced payloads 
makes a significant contribution towards reducing the 
down-time after an HLLV failure. This should be corn pared 
with the alternative of using an HLLV as the primary 
launcher for all the STV, MLL and other critical hardware 
elements. Since such payloads are more expensive, and 
only a few are produced, more care and time will be taken 
to ensure that the HLLV will not fail again immediately 
after an initial failure. Therefore, it is considered likely that 
higher risk levels are more tolerable if the payload being 
launched is inexpensive and built in numbers, especially in 
a contingency situation. (Note : This is essentially the 
strategy used by the USSR Space Program.)
ASPL Utilization
In an SEI scenario, the value of a launcher exhibiting 
ASPL-type performance characteristics is its ability to 
launch reliably and frequently. Therefore, its performance 
should be reserved for those payloads and missions it best 
serves. Specifically, expensive, operational and maintenance 
critical elements. If possible, operational elements like die 
STV, MLL, CLL and lunar base dements should be 
launched individually, because there is a higher dunce of 
reaching orbit, or recovered after an abort, compared with 
the HLLV. The ASPL also offers the potential to return 
elements for ground refurbishment - something impossible 
with HLLVs. For orbital maintenance-type missions,, the 
quick reaction capability of the ASPL allows rapid access - 
particularity in a contingency situation. As discussed 
earlier, the need for a responsive "sortie" capability in large- 
scale space operations should not be underestimated
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In addition, during the development of SEI hardware, the 
ability to test out each element thoroughly in orbit first, 
could be useful for the reasons highlighted in Section 1. 
The availability of ASPL-type capabilities would be critical 
here because of the ability to launch at the kind of high 
flight rates needed to support multiple test flights over a 
relatively short time-scale. The modest payload size, 
recovery capability and low dedicated operational launch 
costs would also contribute significantly to its utilization 
in this role. These characteristics are directly opposite to 
those offered by the HLLV.
It should also be noted that although the ASPL could 
conceivably launch propellant, this would not seem to be a
suitable use of the vehicle as up to 10 flights per lunar 
mission could be needed. Although the total launch cost 
would be about the same, there might be a danger in 
pushing the ASPL unnecessarily to higher flight rates, and 
thereby increasing the probability of failure, especially 
while low on the ASPL learning curve. Also, the added 
complexities of significantly increased orbital operations in 
exchanging up to 10 propellant tanks, could be prohibitive, 
Launching propellant does not seem to be the best use for 
an ASPL.
A critical feature of the optimization process is the launch 
failure resilience, that is, the response to failure of one of
the launch systems. Scenarios involving the failure of 
either the ASPL or HLLV are described below :
MPL Failure : After the initiation of lunar base 
operations, if an ASPL fails and the fleet is grounded - a 
situation 'that is likely to occur during 'the early operational. 
phase of the ASPL - access to the Moon would still be 
possible through use of the HLLV, albeit at a degfaded level 
until the ASPL is available* For example, in a 'Scenario 
where Freedom is used as a node,, the STV and .MLL will 
already, be in oibit Hercfbie* for a manned mission, one 
or two HLLV flights would be one for the TUB 
launch, and the other for the crew and logistics, assuming a 
Personnel Launch SystenKype capsule* If Freedom was 
not being used, then it may also be necessary to launch « 
already stacked STV and MLL on to owed MLLV flight 
and dock, ii to mil the TUGS can be bunched. A. 
similar scenario ft*' cargo missions !dii be envisaged. 
Consideration of this type of scenario should be an 
important m understanding 'tie need for a USD node, 
is It could leduce the ^itepeiicSgicc. mi bwden on the launch 
system*
MLLV : Alternatively! if an HLLV Ms* m
the moon would havr m be halted tor m long as it late to
mortify the HLLV* Bowero; far the outlined 
earlier to His section thta smi-ctowi time is likely to be 
significantly toss than that experienced if an ASH- filled
Tils is feeeiise the cost of an ASPL and its ptyloai is so 
much higher* and oily a few of each are built, compared
with the much cheaper replacement cost of the mass- 
produced HLLV and mass-produced TLIS stage. In an 
extreme scenario, if access to the lunar base was absolutely 
necessary, then it is possible to envisage a situation where 
another TLIS is launched immediately, even if the problems 
of the previous HLLV failure had not been resolved.
6. CONCLUSIONS
There appears to be rational arguments to suggest that it 
may be difficult or impractical to support long-term lunar 
operations using expendable, vertically launched heavy-lift 
type vehicles as the primary launch system because of 
their low reliability and low flight rates. The reasons are 
based on the operational requirements to maintain a level of 
failure resilience and to ensure that continuous access to the 
orbital hardware is always possible. Such requirements are 
indicative of large-scale space activities just as they are for 
any terrestrial activity. For converse reasons, the proposed 
aero-space plane launcher would not be able to support 
lunar activities on its own. However, a combined 
architecture consisting of an ASPL fleet and HLLVs seems 
ideally suited for SEI-type applications, provided careful 
optimization is performed so that payloads are properly 
matched to each launcher. Such an optimization leads to a 
scenario that attempts to ensure continuous access to space, 
while simultaneously being able to minimize the highly 
disruptive impacts of a launch failure and subsequent stand- 
down period*
It is clear that the scenario is critically dependent on the 
development of a vehicle exhibiting ASPL-type 
performance characteristics.. Although it is not certain 'that
such a vehicle is technically feasible, the variety of national 
programs presently underway seems to indicate that the
outcome will be .positive. The potential high value to' all 
space operations of ASPL-type launchers should ;povicfe 
further• motivation to encourage their development.
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